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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND THE QUESTION OF SUBSIDIARITY
Ronald J. Rychlak
John M. Czarnetzky*
I. INTRODUCTION

Before World War II had ended, people started talking about putting
war criminals, like Adolf Hitler and his close associates, on trial for war
crimes.1 Despite the risk that it might be seen as the victors taking
vengeance on the defeated nations, there was a sense that justice had to
2
be served, and justice meant that these criminals had to be put on trial.
One of the voices demanding justice was Pope Pius XII.
Pius XII outlined an international judicial system based upon
traditional Catholic teaching. This calls for punishment of the guilty, but
protection for the innocent. 3 It also implies a limitation on the authority
of the system. In particular, the jurisdiction of the court is limited by the
doctrine of subsidiarity. This doctrine teaches that in all cases, problems
are best addressed at the level closest to that problem. 4 In other words,
the larger entity (in this case, the international association) should always

. The authors are Associate Professors of Law at the University of Mississippi School of
Law and were delegates representing the Holy See at the Preparatory Committee meetings of
the Intermational Criminal Court in November and December 2000.
1 See MICHAEL YOUNG, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF HITLER (1944). For a full historical discussion,
see HERMAN VON HEBEI, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT - A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, IN
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 13 (1999).

2 Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT. L 38 (1947), reprinted in 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 239 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller & Edward 14 Wise, eds., 1965).

3 Pius XII's papal device was "Opus Justitiae Pax" ("the work of justice is peace"). One of
the organizations most supportive of adoption of an international criminal court since 1994 is
the organization named No Peace Without Justice.

4 Pope John Paul 1Iexplained the doctrine of subsidiarity:
[A] community of higher order should not interfere in the internal life
of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its fumctions, but
rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity
with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common

good.
Pope John Paul II, Centissimus Annus (1991); see also CATECHSIM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
§§ 1883-1885 (1994) (describing Catholic Church doctrine on subsidiarity).
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permit the smaller one (national or even local associations) to handle
matters that are within their capabilities. In fact, it is a great evil for the
larger association to assert authority over matters that are appropriately
within the competence of the smaller one.

The international community is on the verge of establishing an
international criminal court. Whether it will actually come into existence,
however, is still in doubt. Ratification is in jeopardy, largely because
nations (particularly the United States) are concerned about sovereignty
are concerned about sovereignty and the ability to maintain
jurisdiction over their own subjects. In order to address these concerns,
the international community has offered reassurance in the form of a new
doctrine named "complementarity." 5 In this paper, we will argue that
while complementarity appears on the surface to offer assurances similar
to those provided by the doctrine of subsidiarity, it is not an adequate
substitute. Subsidiarity would provide a moral basis for favoring
national sovereignty, whereas complementarity offers merely a political
one. The practical result in these early years might be negligible or even
non-existent. In the long run, however, pressure will mount for the
international court to assume greater jurisdiction, and complementarity
will offer no logical basis to resist that pressure; on the other hand,
subsidiarity would offer a logical, moral basis for resisting such
expansion. Such a check on the ICC's power admittedly would be
merely a prudential one on the Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, a prudential doctrine grounded in moral reasoning might,
in those cases in which it is vital that subsidiarity be invoked, have more
weight than a doctrine which reflects a political compromise born of

5 for an excellent discussion of the negotiations which lead to the statutory formulation of
"complementarity" and a flavor of the delicate contours of that notion in the minds of its
drafters, see John T. Holmes, The Principle of Coinpkenentarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41-78 (Roy S. Lee ed.

1999). Though it is, of course, impossible to prove a negative, there seems to have been no
discussion of subsidiarity as a substitute for the notion of complementarity which eventually
was chosen in the Rome Statute. One commentator has suggested that the two concepts are
identical. WILLAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 357, 370-71 (2000). If this is
true, it is not made clear in the Rome Statute or in commentaries on the Statute that have come
to hand. Indeed, from the legislative history of the Statute it seems evident that the negotiators
took great pains to devise a formulation of their own to suit disparate negotiating positions of
different states.
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expediency. Therefore, if ratification indeed proves to be a significant
stumbling block for establishment of the new court, this aspect of the
structure should be re-thought.

II. THE HISTORY OF WAR CRIME TRIBUNALS
Several "war crimes" tribunals have been set up over the past fifty
years. At the end of the Second World War, the Allies conducted
Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals. 6 More recently, ad hoc tribunals
were established to deal with abuses in the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. 7 These tribunals led to the doctrines that shape international
criminal law today. In particular, the Nuremberg Charter rests on the
principle that "individuals have international duties which transcend the
national obligations of obedience imposed by individual states." 8 The

6 Following Nuremberg, soldiers may finally be held accountable for actions
which - though prohibited for years in numerous international and
domestic treaties - had gone unpunished by law for centuries. The
challenged innovation at Nuremberg and Tokyo was not the novelty of the
law or the crimes listed in the indictments. Rather, the shocking
advancement was that the existing laws were finally being enforced in an
international setting.
Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcinent in Intemnational Criminal Law, 15 Am. U.
INT'L L. REv. 321, 334 (2000). See BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT A

STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 88 (1980) (declaring that neither the validity of judgments nor the
fairness of the trial was diminished by the fact that the judges hailed from the victor States).
7 See JOSEPH E. PERSIcO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 442 (1994) (advocating a need to
establish an international instrumentality to punish the perpetrators of over one hundred wars
who have collectively killed millions of people). Between 1945 and 1992 the world experienced
twenty-four wars between nations, costing 6,623,000 civilian and military lives. Ninety-three
civil wars, wars of independence, and insurgencies have cost 15,513,000 additional lives. Until
1993, no international instrument had been convened to try any aggressor or any perpetrator of
war crimes in any of these 117 conflicts. Id.
8 NUREMBERG INTERNATIONAL MILrTARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
223 (1947). Nuremberg was a reactionary body. It was created in reaction to the unspeakable
atrocities committed in Europe during World War II against gypsies, Catholics, homosexuals,
mentally and physically impaired persons, and Jews. Nuremberg was necessary to demonstrate
that if a Third World War occurred, justice in the form of prosecutions and criminal sentences
would be swiftly and sternly administered. Penrose, sapra note 6 at 331.
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tribunals established for the former Yugoslavia 9 and Rwanda, 1 0
reaffirmed the necessity of affixing individual responsibility to specific
individuals.

The events in the former Yugoslavia prompted the United Nations
General Assembly in 1992 to instruct the International Law Commission
(ILC) to prepare a draft statute for a permanent international criminal
court.1 1 The ILC presented its draft to the General Assembly in 1994.
The General Assembly then established an ad hoc committee to refine the
provisions of the ILC draft. The ad hoc committee held several sessions
in 1995, and at the end of that year requested the General Assembly to
convert it into a preparatory committee so that it could begin redrafting
the statute. 1 2

With the endorsement of the Sixth Committee, the General Assembly
formed the Preparatory Committee in 1996 to work on the text of the
statute. In 1998, the United Nations convened the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court to negotiate specifics relating to an
International Criminal Court (ICC). Despite numerous unresolved
issues, the delegates at that conference adopted a draft statute with the
13
requisite number of signatories.

9 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 ("ICTY"), S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175 mtg., U.N. Doc.

S/RES/808 (1993).
10 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda ("ICTR"), S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).

11 Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter defines the Security Council's central role
in the maintenance of international peace and security. U.N. CHARrER art. 39, Action with
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.
12 See Launjers Committee for Human Rights, Establishing an International Crininal Court:
Major Unresolved Issues in the Draft Statute, (introduction), on the Internet at:
http://www.ichr.org/icc/iccpapl.htim.
13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The Rome Conference, unlike the Hague Conferences a century
before, did not represent an exercise in multilateral treaty-making of a
contractual nature, in which unanimity of decision-making is the
fundamental feature. Rather, the governments of the world came to
Rome to engage in what was, in fact, a quasi-legislative effort More than
a treaty, the Rome Statute changes international law and is binding on
non-signatories.

14

As the Preamble to the Rome Statute notes, the purpose of the Court
is to end impunity for the perpetrators of "atrocities that deeply shock
the conscience of humanity." The Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Kofi A. Annan, hailed the statute as "a gift of hope to future
generations," as "one of the finest moments in the history of the United
Nations," and as "a giant step forward in the march towards universal
15
human rights and the rule of law."
The ICC is designed as a treaty-based court with the unique power to
prosecute and sentence individuals, and also to impose obligations of
cooperation upon states, regardless "of whether they are parties to
relevant treaties or have accepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to

183/9 (1998). The Rome conference left certain issues unresolved, and the General Assembly
asigned these issues to the preparatory committee to be finalized. The unresolved issues
included the formulation of rules of procedure and evidence, the definition of aggression, and
elements of crimes additional to the definition of those crimes in the ICC statute. For a
comprehensive history of the events leading up to the Rome Statute, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The
Tine Has Coin for ai lnitenuationalCriminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L REV. 1 (1991).
14 See generally TIMOTHY L DICKINSON, JOINT REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES: ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 1998 A.B.A. SEC.
INT'L L & PRAC 118B (hereinafter 1998 Recommendation] (tracing procedural history of the
International Criminal Court); REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK
OF IS FORTY-SIXTH SESSION, DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 49 U.N.
GAOR, 49 Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/355 (Sept. 1, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Rome
Statute].
15 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE - ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS, siipra note 5, at ix. "The International Criminal Court is the last great
international institution of the Twentieth Century. It is no exaggeration to suggest that its
creation has the potential to reshape our thinking about international law." Leila Nadya Sadat
& S. Richard Carden, The New InterrnationalCrininal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. LJ.381,
385 (2000). "[lit cannot be denied that the adoption of the ICC statute represented an
extraordinary moment for international law." Id. at 391.
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the crimes in question." 1 6 One of the core functions of the ICC is to serve
as a forum in which individuals suspected of committing certain crimes
can be tried when individual states are either unwilling or unable to
bring these alleged perpetrators to justice. It was agreed in Rome that the
court would have jurisdiction over four core crimes: genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.

Sixty States must ratify the Rome Statute before the Court can come
into existence. So far, with 27 nations having ratified as of December 31,
2000, backers of the ICC are less than half way toward their goal. 1 7 The
United States, Israel, and the Holy See are among those nations that have
not yet even ratified the Statute, though the United States and Israel
signed it on the last day for which the statute was open for signature,
presumably to preserve their ability to shape the court in future
preparatory meetings. 1 8 (President Clinton previously had proclaimed
to the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1997, that "before the
century ends, we should establish a permanent international court to
prosecute the most serious violations of humanitarian law.") 1 9 Many
more nations are yet to ratify the treaty. There are several reasons that
contribute to countries' decisions to ratify or not, but one clear concern is
that the nations would be forfeiting their national sovereignty and

16 1998 Recommendation, supra note 14 at 13. See also Lara A. Ballard, Comment, The
Recognition and Enforcement of International Criminal Court Judgments in U.S. Courts, 29 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L.REv. 143, 163 (1997) (noting that "states parties to the ICC treaty that have accepted
the ICC's jurisdiction with regard to the crime in question must respond without undue delay to
the request, which may be for the disclosure of evidence, the apprehension of suspects, or
another form of judicial or police assistance").

17 The conference resulted in adoption of the Rome Statute, with a vote of 120 in favor, 7
against, and 21 abstentions. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (Background
Information U.N. DPLMATc CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT.) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9" Ouly 17,1998), 37 I.L.M. 999.
18 For a complete list of countries' positions on the Rome Statute and their status

regarding signature and/or ratification, and their expressed reservations concerning the court,
see http://www.iccnow.org/html/country.html. This is a website of a non-governmental
organization which tracks events concerning the ICC.
19 Book Revieup and Note: The International Criminal Conrt: The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, Ncgotiations,Results, (Roy S. Lee, ed. 1999), 94 THE AMlER. J.INT'L L. 218 (2000).
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putting their people at risk if they were to sign and ratify the Rome
20
Statute.

III.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND L[ims ON JURISDICTION

Article 22 of the Rome Statute provides that "a person shall not be
criminally responsible under this statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court." 21 In the case of ambiguity, the definition shall be construed in
22
favor of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted."
The Court may exercise jurisdiction if (1) a state party refers a crime
to the Court's prosecutor; (2) the Security Council, acting under Chapter
20 John Bolton, Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute, has stated:
Let me just start off with a little political reality check here and that is
that the United States is not going to ratify the Statute of Rome, the
document that created the International Criminal Court, within the lifetime
of anybody inthis room. There issimply no groundswell of opinion in the
United States in favor of this institution, and I think putting that in context
is important....
Syinposimn: Toward an International Criminal Court? A Debate, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 159,

164 (2000) (comments of John Bolton).
Moreover, the idea that the parties signatory to the Statute of Rome,
however many it turns out to be, can really supervise the Court is a fantasy.
When you are supervised by over 120 or 140 or 160 signatories, whatever it
turns out to be, you're not supervised by anybody. The net-net of this is that
there really isn't any democratic accountability and no constitutional
structures, as we understand those structures. In other words, there's
basically no political control. This is something that the proponents of the
Court welcomes. They say, "This is just great ...the Court will be
independent. The prosecutor will be independent." Well, indeed. In this
country we have had painful, I mean bitterly painful, experience with the
institution of an independent counsel. And now, twenty years plus after the
independent counsel was first created, due to bi-partisan opposition, it lies
in its well-deserved grave, hopefully never to rise again.
Id. at 165. Se also Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: Tic Case Against the Proposed
International Criinial Court, POLICY ANALYSIS, July 16, 1998 on the internet at www.
Cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-311 html ("the court threatens to diminish America's sovereignty").
21 1994 Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 22(l).
22 Id. at art. 22(2).

122
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VII of the U.N. Charter, refers a crime to the prosecutor; or (3) the
prosecutor initiates an investigation into a crime. 23 Because the Security
Council's actions under Chapter VII are mandatory, the Court could
exercise jurisdiction even when neither the state territory where the crime
was committed nor the state of nationality of the offender is a party.2 4 If
the matter is referred by a State Party or initiated proprio motu by the
prosecutor, the Court's jurisdiction is more restricted. In such instances,
jurisdiction extends to the territory of a non-party State only if that State
consents to the jurisdiction of the Court, and either the acts were
committed in the territory of the consenting State or the accused is a
national of the consenting State. 25 The Statute provides for jurisdiction
ratione personae over natural persons only (thereby excluding
26
organizations or States).
The United States has expressed its opposition to the Article 15
authorization of the prosecutor "to initiate investigations and
prosecutions of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the court, in the
absence of a referral of an overall situation by either a state party to the
treaty or the Security Council." 2 7 The Rome Statute contains a complex
procedure by which a Pre-Trial Chamber is to supervise cases in which
the prosecutor exercises his or her investigatory powers.28 The
prosecutor may commence an investigation only if both he or she and the
23 Id. at art. 13.
24 Id. at art. 13(b). See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Background Information, on the Internet at:
http://www.un.org/icc/ [hereinafter U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
(discussing authority of Security Council to refer situations to the Court).
25 See 1994 Rome Statute, supra note 14, arts. 4(2); Id. at art 12(2) ("The Court may exercise
its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute ... (a) The State
on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on

board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b)The State of which
the person accused of the crime is a national.") (emphasis added); U.N. Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries. Id. Therefore, the Court would still be unable to exercise jurisdiction over

crimes committed within the territory of a non-state party by that state's own nationals.
26 Sec 1994 Rome Statute, supra note 14, arts. 1, 25(1). The Statute does not permit trials in
absentia. Thus, the Court must always have the defendant in its custody to obtain personal
jurisdiction, in the sense that U.S. lawyers use the term. See id. at art. 63(1).
27 David J.Scheffer, The United States and the InternationalCriminal Court, 93 Am. J.INT'L L
at 12, 13, 18 (1999).
28 Sr, 1994 Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 53(3).
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Pre-Trial Chamber have determined that a "reasonable basis ' 29 exists to
initiate the investigation. 30 This check on the authority of the prosecutor
has been insufficient to persuade the United States that jurisdiction is
sufficiently limited.
The United States has cited fears that the Statute would put U.S.
soldiers and other military personnel at risk for prosecution as a major
reason for voting against it. These fears are not without foundation.
Charges of "war crimes" and "genocide" have been leveled in the past
against U.S. presidents and high ranking government officials in other
countries. 3 1
It is, of course, possible to limit the court's jurisdiction in such a way
so as to reassure those nations that are concerned about sovereignty
issues. An "opt-out" provision already allows a country to remove its
citizens from exposure to liability with respect to certain crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC (except the crime of genocide for which
jurisdiction is automatic). Other issues include limiting the type of crimes
that may be prosecuted in the ICC. 32 Undoubtedly, however, the most
29 Reasonable basis is not defined in the Statute, but article 53 suggests that a finding of
reasonable basis has three elements: (a) there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; (b) the case is or would be
admissible under article 17; (c) the investigation serves the interests of justice, taking into
account the gravity of the crime and the interest of victims. See 1994 Rome Statute, supra note 14,
at art. 53(1). In addition to considering admissibility of a case under article 17 and the interests
of justice, the Prosecutor should consider whether there is"a sufficient legal or factual basis to
seek a warrant or summons under article 58." Id.at art. 53(2)(a).
30 1994 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 15(3), (4). If a State or the Security Council refers
a situation, however, the matter is referred to the Court under article 13(a) or under article 13(b),
respectively, and the Prosecutor will initiate an investigation pursuant to article 53, unless there
is no reasonable basis to proceed under the Statute. See id. at art. 53(1). The Statute permits the
Pre-Trial Chamber to order an investigation or prosecution to proceed if the Prosecutor's
decision is based solely on a determination that the prosecution would not serve the interests of
justice. See id. art. 53(3)(b). See id., at art. 53(3)(b).
31 Final Report of American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court, 28
INT'L LAW 475,480 (1994).

32 Whitney R. Harris, a member of the prosecution team for the United States at the
Nuremberg Trial, argued:
If the (Nuremberg] Tribunal had assumed jurisdiction to try persons
under international law for crimes committed by them which were not

124
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interesting jurisdictional feature of the Rome Statute, and perhaps the
most hotly debated, is the doctrine of complementarity.

IV. COMPLEMENTARrrY
Complementarity, a new doctrine in international law, is one of the
most important underlying principles of the Rome Statute. 33 As used in
the ICC, "complementarity" denotes "a secondary role - not in
importance but in the sequence of events. In other words, national courts
have the first right and obligation to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes, and because ICC jurisdiction is complementary to
national courts, ICC jurisdiction can only be invoked if the national court
34
is unwilling or unable to prosecute.

related to war it would have wholly disregarded the concept of sovereignty
and subjected to criminal prosecution under international law individuals
whose conduct was lawful under controlling municipal law in times of
peace. Such jurisdiction should never be assumed by an ad hoc military
tribunal established to adjudicate crimes of war.
WI trrNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE EvIDENcE AT NUREMBERG 512 (1954).
33 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Reflections on thte Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the
International Criminal Court, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 67 (von

Hebel, Lammers, & Schukking, eds., 1999). The Tenth Preambular Paragraph of the Rome
Statute proclaims that "the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." 1994 Rome Statute, supra note 14, pmbl.
Article I of the ICC Statute mentions the principle of complementarity as one of the cornerstones
of the ICC regime.
,M Johan D. van der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, 14 EmoRY INT'L L REV. 1, 67-68 (2000) ("Initially, some delegations in the Ad Hoc
Committee and Preparatory Committee lamented the fact that complementarity was included in
the Preamble, because they believed that it afforded to the principle of complementarity too
great a significance.") The International Criminal Tribunals for both the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda proceeded on the contrary assumption, namely that their jurisdiction enjoys precedence
over that of national courts. Statute of the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 9(2), 32
I.LM.1192, 1194 (1993); Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 8(2), 33 I.LM. 1602,1605 (1994).
Sec also Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 I.LR. 420, 440-41, paras. 41-44 (Intl. Criminal Trib. for Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber 1995); Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 453, 476-85, paras. 50-64 (Int'l.
Criminal Trib. for Former Yugo., Appeals Chamber 1995); Jelena Pejic, The Tribunal and the ICC:
Do Prccedents Matter?, 60 ALa. L. REV. 841, 854-55 (1997).
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"The whole idea of complementarity is that it's better for the national
courts to try people." 3 5 Article 17 of the Rome Statute, under the
heading of "Issues of Admissibility," provides:
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the
Court shall determine that the case is inadmissible where:

(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution;

(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State
genuinely to prosecute;

(c) The person concerned has already been tried for
conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial
by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph
3;36

35 Symposiin, supra note 20, at 186 (comments of Kenneth Roth). See also Jelena Pejic,
Creating a Permanent InternationalCi iininal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectniness, 29
COLUM. HUM. Rs. L REV. 291,308-10 (1998).
36. Article 20 deals with double jeopardy. Paragraph 3 stipulates instances where the
principle of iebis inidein will not apply. These include, for example, if the purpose of the earlier
trial was to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC, or the proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially in
accordance with the rules of due process recognized by international law.
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(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further
37
action by the Court.

The complementarity principle, as it is set forth in the Statute, will
generally restrain the exercise of the Court's prescriptive jurisdiction so
that it does not exceed what reasonable theories of power distribution
and lawmaking authority between "sovereigns" suggest the proper
sphere of the Court's authority should be. 3 8 Some commentators,
however, noted that it would have been helpful for the Statute to have
39
been more explicit on this point.

Despite the principle of complementarity, the decision as to whether
a State is unwilling or unable to conduct a meaningful trial will
ultimately not be made by that State. 4 0 It will have to be decided by the
ICC, and this raises important issues pertinent to state sovereignty.

The Court will have to consider whether there has been
undue delay in the state-initiated prosecution indicative
of a lack of a genuine intention to proceed, or whether the
domestic case is conducted independently and
impartially, consistent with the expressed intention to
bring the person to justice. In other words, is the State
acting in good faith? This is not a standard issue in
37 1994 Rome Statute, supranote 14, at art. 17.
38 Webster's dictionary defines "complementarity" as "the interrelationship or the
completion or perfection brought about by the interrelationship of one or more units
supplementing, being dependent upon, or standing in polar position to another unit or other
units." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philip B.
Cove ed., 1986).
39 Sadat & Carden, supra note 15, at 408. "For, without a doubt, there will be cases in
which complementarity will not pose an obstacle to jurisdiction but which the Court should
dismiss as inadmissible, because it would be unreasonable for the Court as an instrument of the
international legal order, to exercise jurisdiction over the case." Id.
40 "Essentially it will involve a dispute between the Prosecutor and the State ....Prior

then to making much progress on the investigation, the Prosecutor may be embroiled - possibly
for a long time - in a complex dispute with one or more States." Louise Arbour & Morten
Bergsmo, Conspicuous Absence of larisdictionalOverreach, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 33, at 129,131.
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criminal cases. It is a highly complex and litigious
jurisdictional matter that could nearly paralyze the Court,
41
especially in its early years.

The ICC will not simply accept the State's assurance that it can
handle the case. "The Court is required to examine whether, despite the
State's assertion that it can successfully manage the domestic processing,
that State is unable to obtain the accused, or the evidence, or otherwise to
carry out the proceedings." 4 2 The Preparatory Committee's Report of
1996 recorded some concerns in this regard:

It was noted that while the determination of "availability"
of national criminal systems was more factual, the
determination of whether such a system was "ineffective"
was too subjective. Such a determination would place the
Court in the position of passing judgement on the penal
system of a State. That would impinge on the sovereignty
of national legal systems and might be embarrassing to
that State to the extent that it might impede its eventual
cooperation with the Court. 4 3

The principle of complementarity cannot avoid this problem, but many
supporters of the ICC suggest that a court of limited jurisdiction will not
pose a threat to national sovereignty.44 This is far from certain.

41 Id. at 129,131.
42 Id.
43 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court 38, para. 161.
44 "The principle of complementarity says that if a nation is worried about having its
people called before the International Criminal Court, it need only investigate them
conscientiously itself and if appropriate, prosecute them. That is an absolute defense to any
prosecution by the ICC." Syinposiwn, supra note 20, at 171 (comments of Kenneth Roth,
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch). The Treaty also commands that the Court is to
exercise its jurisdiction only in cases involving "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole." 1994 Rome Statute, supra note14, at art.5(l); see also
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Complementarity may actually force nation states to change their
domestic substantive criminal laws.4 5 As one supporter of the ICC has
explained, in order to convince the ICC that it is willing and able to
prosecute those crimes that are defined in the Rome Statute, a state may
need to adopt its own laws prohibiting those crimes.
States may need to introduce new criminal laws, proscribing
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, if they do not have
such laws already. The simplest approach is to adopt the definitions of
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. However, States may wish
to go beyond these definitions, and give their courts jurisdiction over
other international crimes as well.46
Moreover, as the ICC decides these cases and begins to develop a
common law of what constitutes effective and acceptable national trials,
States will be forced to follow those precedents or risk having their
defendants re-tried before the ICC. State grants of amnesty or pardons
are unlikely to be effective. These issues will, of course, be matters of
great concern to nations who see the Rome Statute and the ICC as a
47
threat to national sovereignty.
A different issue relates to the possible creation of a compensation
fund for victims. This, of course, will create an incentive for victims to
have their case heard by the ICC, at least in those situations where the

comments of Kenneth Roth, Syonposiun, supra note 20, at 171. Other supporters simply think
that national sovereignty is not that important.
45 Hans-Peter Kaul of the German Foreign Ministry and head of the German delegation to
the Preparatory Commission noted that the ICC might serve to harmonize national criminal
laws among the States. Jennifer Schense, Trends Einerging in Implementation of the ICC Statute,
THE MoNITOR, Nov. 2000, at 18.
46 Joanne Lee, Ratifyiig and Inplemnenting the Rome Statute, THE MONITOR, Nov. 2000, at 3:
Note the assumption that a state will be unable to prosecute aggression. See also Dempsey, supra
note 20 (suggesting that in a case of genocide, the national court would be unable to prosecute).
47 The United States, for instance, brought up matters of amnesty and pardons for
discussion during ICC deliberations. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE 72 (1998) (recommending that such
matters not be recognized by the ICC).
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State has no similar fund. This may force States to adopt new laws and
procedures and thereby further influence national legal systems.

Perhaps the greater threat to national sovereignty does not relate to
potential changes in substantive law, but to changes that might be
necessary to a nation's procedural laws. Article 88 of the Rome Statute
requires that State Parties "ensure that there are procedures available
under their national laws for all of the forms of cooperation that are
specified [elsewhere in the statute]."48 This may require adoption of
certain procedures, and according to at least one commentator, it may
also require deletion of certain features of a nation's procedural laws:
States ... need to ensure that their... criminal laws and
procedures will not shield persons from criminal
responsibility for these types of crimes .... While
national laws on these matters do not have to be identical
to the Rome Statute provisions, States should ensure that
their laws do not provide undesirable loopholes for
perpetrators.

49

Presumably all states, regardless of the Rome Statute, try not to provide
"undesirable loopholes" for criminal defendants. The question becomes
whether a State's "Bill of Rights" might be viewed by the ICC as a
loophole.

50

48 1994 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 88.
49 Id.
50 Dempsey, supranote 20 (noting that many rights taken for granted by Americans would
not be available in trials before the ICC); Cathie Adams, The United Nations, THE HERIAGE
FOUNDATION, Nov. 1998, on the Internet at www.fri.com/heritage/nov98/AdamsCathie.html;
(pointing out that defendants in front of this court will be denied their Sixth Amendment rights).
The Rome Statute requires all States Parties to "cooperate fully with the Court in its
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court." 1994 Rome
Statute, supra note 14, at art. 86.
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Americans have seen a federal court system, of supposed limited
jurisdiction, grow dramatically over the past forty years. Those who
opposed this expansion were left to argue the political points of
"federalism" or "states' rights." There is every reason to think that the
ICC will receive similar pressure to expand, and nations that are
concerned about their sovereignty are likely to be left without persuasive
arguments. This is because the complementarity doctrine is based
strictly on political will; it does not rest upon a moral basis. Thus, when
it seems appropriate, and political will shifts, there will be no principled
basis on which to oppose expansion of the ICC's jurisdiction. If,
however, the ICC's structure were based upon a principle grounded in
moral or philosophical reasoning rather than political compromise, that
principle (properly applied) might prove a more successful prudential
protection of national sovereignty in appropriate cases. That is the
reason we believe that the principle of subsidiarity is superior to the
doctrine of complementarity.

V. SUBSIDIARITY

The principle of subsidiarity teaches that "it is an injustice, a grave
evil and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization
to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by
smaller and lower bodies." 5 1 It was first explicitly formulated in 1931 in
Quadragesino Anno,5 2 when Pope Pius XI authoritatively proclaimed
that:

51 Pope Pius XI, Qttadragesino Anito (1931); CATECHSiM OF THE CA"-OUC CHURCH, supra
note 4, at §§ 1883-1885 (describing Catholic Church doctrine on subsidiarity).
52 While Quadragesiono Anno (1931) is generally considered the first formulation of the
doctrine of subsidiarity, the foundational principles were laid in Leo Xlli's encyclical Rervin

Novarurn . In Rerwin Novarton, Leo XIII revealed the priority of the person to society and the
natural right of individuals to form associations, which, in turn, formed the origins of
community and society. Leo XIII also emphasized in Rerum Novarum the importance of

intermediate associations, such as the family and unions, in resolving societal ills, and their
primacy over government involvement.
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Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what
they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry
and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and
at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right
order to assign to a greater and higher association what
lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every
social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to
the members of the body social, and never destroy and
absorb them.

The encyclical goes on to note:

the State should leave to these smaller groups the
settlement of business of minor importance. It then will
perform with greater freedom, power and success the
tasks belonging to it, because it alone can effectively
accomplish these directing, watching, stimulating and
restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity
demands.

Thus, the principle of subsidiarity favors action by the "smaller and
lower bodies." Higher levels of government should intercede only when
a more local structure cannot or will not do what is necessary to meet the
53
needs of individuals or society.

Subsidiarity has been characterized as "neither a theological nor even
really a philosophical principle, but a piece of congealed historical

53 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, sllpra note 4, at §§ 1883-1885. Catholic teaching
is misunderstood if it is argued that it is the duty of those occupying higher office to direct the
lower degrees in order to insure that they perform their activities properly. Id. at § 1885 ("The
principle of subsidiarity is opposed to all forms of collectivism. It aims at harmonizing the

relationships between individuals and societies.
international order.")

It tends toward the establishment of true
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wisdom." 54 The most fundamental facet of the theory is that it is gravely
wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own
initiative and industry and give it to the community. Subsidiarity
recognizes that the individual will not always be able to do for himself,
but where that is true, the individual should be assisted by an
intermediate association, such as the family, the Church, schools, and
unions. And assistance should come from the intermediate association
closest to the problem, with less- involved, more detached associations
only used when absolutely necessary.

VI. THE ADVANTAGE OF SUBSIDIARITY OVER COMPLEMENTARrY IN THE ICC
CONTEXT

The concept of an international criminal court, like the United
Nations itself, grew out of a perceived moral, not political, imperative.
The Holy See has played an important role in shaping that morality. In
1939, Pope Pius XII wrote that "it is of the first importance to erect some
juridical institution which shall guarantee the loyal and faithful
fulfilment" of treaty obligations.5 5 In the years that followed, he called
upon the nations to form an international organization, which grew into
the United Nations, and he also wrote of institutional agreements (like
the Rome Statute) that were binding on non-signatories. 5 6 At the end of
World War II, he cooperated with the prosecutors at Nuremberg,
cautioning that only the guilty should be punished.

In 1951, the Economic and Social Council, through Resolution 393B
(XIII) asked fifteen States, including the Holy See to serve as members of
an Advisory Committee on Refugees. In addition, the Holy See was
invited to the 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries to consider and
54 John S. Coleman, S.J., Development of Cluarci Social Teachting, in READINGS IN MORAL
THEOLOGY No.5: OFFICIAL CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, 169, 183 (Charles Curran & Richard A.
McCormick, S.J.,
eds.. 1986).
55 Pius Xli's 1939 Christmas Message, quotcd in GUIDO GONELLA, THE PAPACY AND WORLD
PEACE: A STUDY OF THE CHRISTMAS MESSAGES OF POPE PIUS XII, 165 (1950).
56 Id. at 166,165-88.
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debate the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the draft
Protocol Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 5 7 Moreover, the
Holy See was admitted to several Charter and Treaty organizations of the
United Nations including the Food and Agriculture Organization [1948],
the World Health Organization [1951], the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization [1951], and the International Atomic
Energy Agency [1956].58 The Holy See was elected as an Observer to the
UN's Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] in 1956.

Pope John XXIII's 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris, drew attention to
the interrelated rights and responsibilities of individuals and nations.
One of the most important elements of this encyclical is Pope John's
acknowledgment of the role of the United Nations to achieve the
common good for all peoples. 5 9 The particular role ["right and duty"] of
the Holy See in this regard was "not only to safeguard the principles of
ethics and religion, but also to intervene authoritatively with Her
children in the temporal sphere, when there is a question of judging the
application of [principles of the natural law] to concrete cases." 6 0 John's
immediate successor, Paul VI, proclaimed his version of this same
message in 1965. In the first papal address made before the General
Assembly, Paul VI commented on his role and the presence of the Holy
See in the world community:
He is your brother, and even one of the least among you,
representing as you do sovereign States, for he is vested if it please you so to think of Us-with only a mute and
quasi-symbolic temporal sovereignty, only so much as is
needed to leave him free to exercise his spiritual mission
and to assure all those who treat with him that he is
independent of every worldly sovereignty. He has no
temporal power, no ambition to compete with you. In

57 Se UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK 520 (1951).
58 se H.E. HYGINUS EUGENE CARDINALE, THE HOLY SEE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
233 (1976).
59 Pacern in Terris, at Nos. 142-145.
60 Id. at 160.
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point of fact, We have nothing to ask for, no question to
raise; at most a wish to express and a permission to
request: to serve you, within Our competence,
disinterestedly, humbly and in love ...Whatever your

opinion of the Roman Pontiff, you know Our mission: We
are the bearer of a message for all mankind. 61
The pope continued by stating that, "We have been carrying in Our heart
for nearly twenty centuries [a wish]. We have been on the way for a long
time and We bear with Us a long history; here We celebrate the end of a
laborious pilgrimage in search of a colloquy with the whole world, a
pilgrimage which began when We were given the command: 'Go and
bring the good news to all nations.' And it is you who represent all
nations." 6 2 Paul noted that the "moral and solemn ratification" of the
UN was founded on the Holy See's position as an "expert in
humanity. ' 63 In 1964, Pope Paul took the initiative to send an Observer
of the Holy See to the United Nations in order that its "supra-national"
voice would become a regular a part of the dialogue in the UN
deliberations affecting peace and the common good.
In 1998, at the Diplomatic Conference in Rome, Archbishop Renato
Martino, the Holy See's nuncio to the United Nations, quoted Pope John
Paul II:
Within the international community the Holy See
supports every effort to establish effective juridical
structures for safe guarding the dignity and fundamental
rights of individuals and communities. Such structures
however can never be sufficient in themselves; they are
only mechanisms which need to be inspired by a firm and

61 ADDRESS OF POPE PAUL VI TOTHE UNITED NATIONS, October 4,1965.

62 Id.
63 Id.
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persevering moral commitment to the good of the human
64
family as a whole.

The archbishop then went on to highlight several considerations
regarding the establishment of the ICC, directing much attention to
65
justice, morality, and the dignity of "human persons."

For the most part, the United Nations has embraced moral positions
and merged them with political realities. In so doing, the UN has done
much to advance justice and human rights. In this fundamental issue of
national sovereignty, however, the UN opted for the political solution
instead of the moral position.

John Bolton, Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise
Institute, explained his objections to the ICC in terms of structural
problems and a huge central administration that will not be accountable
to anyone.

[T]his Statute of Rome creates not just a court, but it
creates an enormous, potentially enormous, source of
executive power: the prosecutor, just kind of out there in
the international environment. Beyond control. Certainly
beyond control of the United States and not part of any
ordered structure of accountability. This is the kind of
creation of authority that, I think, a free people should
find unacceptable. This is not a passive court, moreover,
like the International Court of Justice, but, particularly in
the form of the prosecutor, a potentially very powerful
actor.

66

64 On the Internet at http://srchl.un.org/icc/speeches/616hls.hbi.
65 Id.
66 Symposimn, supm note 20, at 164-65 (comments of John Bolton).
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Bolton went on to explain: "This court is just kind of an arm and a leg
out there. It's not part of a coherent constitutional structure. It's subject
to no popular accountability-the prosecutor isn't. There are no structures
that give me faith, as a free person, that it's authority won't be
abused." 6 7 These are precisely the types of problems that subsidiarity
cautions against.

The central argument in support of an International Criminal Court is
that it will function as a deterrent by letting war criminals know that they
face punishment.6 8 Of course, there have not been many war criminals
who have faced trial in the past 50 years. This has caused at least one
commentator to say that "the newly created ("ICC" or "Court") is a
solution in need of problems."'6 9 If more crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC are not found over the next 50 years, 7 0 people will likely begin to
question the need for the Court.7 1 This will almost certainly lead to
pressure on the ICC to expand its jurisdiction (further threatening
national sovereignty). Already supporters have advocated expanding

67 Id.

68 This argument, however, is not based on much evidence. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia had indicted people, and while those cases were pending
Slobodan Milosevic commenced a campaign of ethnic deansing, killing, and systematic rape in
Kosovo. Symposium, supra note 20, at 166 (comments of John Bolton) As one commentator has
noted: "The idea that the orders of this court are going to be routinely enforced by anybody
except when it's intheir political interest to do so is just flatly wrong." Id. (comments of John
Bolton). In fact, if the International Criminal Tribunals at Nuremberg Tokyo, the former
Yugoslavia, and Arusha are used as a gauge for deterring future violence, the international
community must admit failure. Penrose, supra note 6, at 325. See Tom Gjelten, Conference on War
Crimes Tribunals: Tribual Justice, the C allenges, the Record, and the Prospects, 13 AM. U. IN'L L.
Rtv. 1541,1556 (1998).
69 Molly McConville, Note: A Global War on Drugs: Mhy the United States Should Support The
Prosecutionof Drug Traffickers in the
,37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 75,76 (2000).
70 In theory, after all, "the ICC will operate only in exceptional circumstances." Human
Rights Watch, supra note 48 at 71.
71 According to one critic: "I would have no problem if the United Nations wanted to set
up a structure of judges and prosecutors on a stand-by basis to be called in on ad hoc situations.
That's enough of a threat to me without getting into a big standing organization ....
So you
need to have a threat, but the threat should be on a stand-by basis." Symposium, supra note 20, at
196 (comments of Judge Griffin Bell). A permanent military or international criminal court,
however, may not be necessary. See Grant M. Dawson, Defining SubstAntive Crimes Within the
Subject Matter jnrisdiction of the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression?, 19
N.Y.L.SCH. J. IN-rL & Comrp. L. 413,431 (2000).
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ICC coverage to include human rights violations and violations of other
international prohibitions. In fact, Resolution E to the Rome Statute
provides that the issues of terrorism and drug crimes should be taken up
at a Review Conference, with a view to their ultimate inclusion in the
jurisdiction of the Court.7 2 Proposals have also been made to expand
jurisdiction to cover "serious threats to the environment" and
"committing outrages on personal dignity." 7 3 Blockades, embargos, and
even seizing of assets could - depending how on-going negotiations are
74
resolved - constitute the crime of aggression.

If enough States are willing to amend the Statute to cover more
crimes and apply to more criminals, nations in opposition to this
expansion on national sovereignty grounds would have a much stronger
argument if the ICC were based on subsidiarity than they will have with
complementarity as the basis. Recognition of this eventuality may be one
75
reason that some States are reluctant when it comes to ratification.

There is no impediment for subsidiarity to serve as the basis for
modern international agreements. The Maastricht Treaty adopts the
subsidiarity principle without detracting from the primacy of the Treaty
of European Union. In fact, subsidiarity lies at the core of the European
Community's Social Charter, and it stands as a maxim for arranging the
order of all types of social institutions within the Community, including
the delimitation of competencies between the European Communities

72 See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Annex 1,Res. F,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998) [hereinafter
Establishment of an _
Final Act] at Arnex 1, Res. E. The Statute addresses the need for continuing oversight by the
States Parties by establishing an Assembly of States Parties and providing rules for its

organization and operation.
73 Dempsey, supra note 20.
74 Id.
75 The United States, for instance, proposed during negotiations that the principle of
complementarity be invoked earlier, prior to the beginning of an investigation. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 47, at 69. "While States agreed to the establishment of the Court in principle,
and even to its jurisdiction in theory, they may not be willing to make the kinds of concessions

to international cooperation necessary to the successful operation of the Court in practice."
Sadat & Carden, supra note 15, at 392.
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and the Member States. 7 6 Additionally, subsidiarity is an important
part of George W. Bush's "compassionate conservatism" approach to
77
government.

On the surface, subsidiarity and complementarity seem very similar.
Each, when applied to the ICC, suggest that primary jurisdiction should
rest with the nation state. With complementarity, however, this is a
simple political choice. With subsidiarity, the jurisdictional decision
flows out of a broader, moral position. That moral position will not
change just because political will does. As a coherent theory, subsidiarity
supplies a way to organize a society that is consistent with both human
nature and human potential. Complementarity offers no similar
organizational structure. In fact, it tends to contribute to structural
problems that the ICC may create.

VII. CONCLUSION

When the drafters of the Rome Statute abandoned subsidiarity and
opted instead for the doctrine of complementarity, they took away the
moral basis for arguing that States should have primary jurisdiction in
the cases at issue. Instead, the argument against dramatic expansion of
the ICC rests on a purely political basis. Perhaps this distinction will
make no difference in practice; on the other hand, perhaps in the small
number of cases where a great deal is at stake in the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction, a prudential doctrine grounded in moral reasoning will
make the answers to difficult questions either clearer or more palatable

76 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, as amended art 3(b) (principle of
subsidiarity provides that when the EU does not have exclusive jurisdiction, the EU will act only
if the Member States cannot achieve the objectives of the proposed action). See also Larry Cata
Backer, Hannonization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An Essay on the Dynamics of Opposition
Within Federateand InternationalLegal Systems, 4 TuLSA J. COMP. & INT'LL. 185,211 (1997).
77 George W. Will, Keeping Faith Behind Initiatives, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2001, at B07 (noting
that the doctrine of subsidiarity is an important factor in some of President Bush's initiatives);
Andrew Sullivan. Bush Woos Catholic Conservatives, THE SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), June 25, 2000
(noting the importance of Catholic social doctrine, particularly the doctrine of subsidiarity, in
the political thinking of then-candidate George W. Bush).
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than a prudential doctrine buttressed by political compromise. As such,
complementarity offers less to individual nations concerned about
sovereignty in the face of a shift in political will that would give primary
jurisdiction to the ICC. Once this is recognized, opposition to the ICC by
nations such as the United States is easier to understand. A small step,
but one which might render the ICC acceptable to hesitant nations, is to
explicitly embrace the concept of subsidiarity, and shelve its weaker
cousin, complementarity.

